Türkiye’s shocking election offers lessons against electoral dictatorship

After all, Mr. Erdoğan’s own political career began three decades ago after a successful stint as mayor of Istanbul. Born in this metropolis as a humble immigrant from Turkey’s Black Sea coast, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan began his journey through competent and ambitious governance, including a construction boom in Istanbul and major public works projects under his watch. He staked his legitimacy on his achievements. His appeal to the urban working class, including more pious immigrants from the Turkish hinterland, would continue to form the core of his brand of religiously-tinged populist nationalism. This ideology opposed the old system of secular elites, but now flows under an illiberal majority. Erdoğan’s government has consolidated its position in power.

Introducing the current CHP Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu. He emerged as a key figure in a new generation of politicians in Turkish affairs after thwarting a full-fledged AKP campaign to remove him from public office. He explicitly framed his re-election in a global perspective, positioning his success as a sign of how opposition parties and voters can resist electoral dictatorships such as the one Erdogan had established in the final years of his government.

İmamoğlu said Sunday’s elections “signal an end to the erosion of democracy in Turkey and a return to democracy.” “The people who were oppressed under the dictatorship are now turning to Istanbul.” The next morning, the victorious mayor of Istanbul moved to the city center, nodding to the possibility of challenging Erdoğan in the future. In front of the assembled supporters, he declared, “The era of leadership being led by one person is over.”

This development is fueled first and foremost by voter anger at the frustrating status quo. My colleagues Beryl Eski and Kareem Fahim wrote, “Household finances have been hit hard by runaway inflation and the plummeting value of the currency, and Erdogan appeared to be the biggest issue on the campaign trail.” “It was an economic response.” “Despite President Erdoğan’s appointment last year to a well-regarded economic team and his decision to allow the central bank to raise interest rates to the highest levels in decades, inflation remains at around 70%. There is.”

Financial concerns and social depression appear to have deterred some of the AKP’s voter base from voting. It is also possible that some right-wing AKP voters may have moved to other parties as dissatisfaction with the stagnation under the long-term ruling AKP deepened. This includes Islamist parties that have broken with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan over his refusal to sever economic ties with Israel over the Gaza war.

But perhaps the most important dynamic is the one that facilitated CHP’s success. The party is tied to Turkey’s nationalist, secularist past and, as Asli Aydintasbas, a Turkey researcher at the Brookings Institution, told me, it has long been too “arbitrary and elitist.” It has been seen as “targeted” and “seeming to appeal only to urban secularists.” ” Its former leader, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who is in his 70s, has repeatedly lost elections to Mr. Erdogan, including last year.

But new talent is taking the lead, from Mr. Kilikdaroglu’s successor, Ozgur Ozer, to Mr. İmamoğlu himself, who can claim an identity as an ordinary man like Mr. Erdoğan. And they are building a broader coalition. In Sunday’s election, many CHP candidates from outside the Kurdish-majority southeast supported candidates who could defeat the AKP (rather than candidates from the main pro-Kurdish parties) as a protest vote against Erdoğan. was boosted by support from Kurdish voters.

Elections in Turkey are somewhat free, but not particularly fair, Given that President Erdoğan and the AKP have great control over the state apparatus and influence over the media. But Sunday’s election showed that even in this illiberal context, things can change quickly. On Monday, Turkey woke up to a dramatically different set of political realities than less than a year ago, when President Recep Tayyip Erdogan secured re-election despite an economic downturn and the horrific effects of an earthquake that devastated the south.

“Some argued that President Erdoğan’s supporters will always support him. Others argued that the president has consolidated his dictatorship and cannot be defeated at the ballot box.” , explained Gonur Tolu, Turkey Program Director at the Middle East Institute, referring to analysts’ talking points after the 2023 elections. “The CHP’s victory in Sunday’s city council vote proves both sides wrong. This shows that despite the uneven playing field, elections matter and voters ultimately shows you vote with your wallet.”

There are no major elections scheduled for the next four years. As Sonar Cagaptay, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, puts it, Erdoğan will probably seek to extend his rule in 2028 by “reconstitution of a club of right-wing nationalists and Islamists who support him and the AKP.” will aim for. Secure 50% or more of the votes. However, it may prove to be a more difficult task than many previously anticipated.

After the 2023 elections, “many analysts have concluded that Turkish politics is fairly predictable and that President Erdogan will remain in power permanently with no real challengers,” Cagaptay said. told me. But the spotlight is now on the mediocrity of the candidates who ran under his banner, losing by considerable margins in cities such as Istanbul and Ankara.

“President Erdogan is currently facing a succession problem,” Cagaptay added. “Anyone he appoints as his representative fails miserably.”

This is less of a problem for the opposition, which has gained momentum with Imammoğlu at the forefront.. Aydintasbas argued that the Istanbul mayor’s success is related to three factors that offer lessons for liberal democrats in other regions.

First, “charisma is key,” she says, and Imamoglu has that in spades. It may be far better to have a genuinely popular figure lead the opposition effort than a compromise candidate, a Kilikdaroglu-style candidate, who cannot win the support of a significant number of voters. Second, İmamoğlu has built a coalition of voters, including Kurds, who were once averse to the CHP’s elitist and secularist legacy but who proved essential to his re-election in Istanbul. There is a possibility that we can expect expansion.

And third, Imamoğlu had his own track record of competent governance and administration. “Until we convince voters that we can serve them well, anger and hype about democracy is not enough,” Aydintasbas told me. This has already been demonstrated in elections across Europe, from Sweden to the Netherlands, where far-right parties defeated forces bent on destroying beleaguered liberals.

İmamoğlu links his politics to that of liberal mayors in capitals such as Warsaw and Budapest who faced similarly illiberal central governments. “He understands the struggle between authoritarianism and democracy, and that is central,” Aydintasbas concluded. “But he’s smart enough not to simplify it to that.”