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With the European Parliament elections just two months away, the final outcome appears to be all but determined. ‘Far-right takeover is underway’, experts warn foreign policy. “Now the far-right threat is real,” the prophets added. politiko. And regardless of whether they use the term “far-right” exaggeratedly or not, such caution is natural. Even if the center-right European People’s Party (EPP) remains the largest force in parliament, the two biggest winners are expected to be the EPP’s right-wing Identity and Democracy (ID) and the European Conservatives and Reformists. (ECR). According to the latest opinion polls, the latter two groups alone could account for more than 20% of parliamentarians and win almost as many seats as the EPP alone.
If we add in members of right-wing parties who are not currently affiliated with any group, such as Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz MP, we could create the first right-wing and populist coalition in the history of the European Parliament, potentially losing seats in the European Parliament. There is. His “super-grand coalition” of three centrist groups (EPP, S&D, and Renew Europe) currently controls EU institutions. But that’s easier said than done. Europe’s right-wing populist parties are far from a united front, apart from the near-impossibility of a coalition between the EPP and ID. Indeed, opinion polls show a very close race between the ECR and ID for the third place in the European Parliament, with the two groups and their unofficial leader Giorgia Meloni. Marine Le Pen is currently in contention. A fierce battle for the leadership of Europe’s right.
This was brought into stark relief early last week when ID groups, including Italy’s Matteo Salvini’s coalition, France’s Marine Le Pen National Rally, Germany’s AfD and Austria’s Freedom Party, gathered in Rome for a convention. Salvini and Le Pen reaffirmed that they would not support the re-election of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen (VDL) and criticized Meloni for not ruling out an agreement with the EPP over VDL’s re-election. .
Over the past two years, Meloni has forged close ties with the VDL, accompanying him on European diplomatic trips to Tunisia and Egypt to curb migration. The reason is rooted in his self-interest. Meloni believes maintaining strong allies in Brussels is crucial to his survival in power, even at the cost of disappointing his voters and his own coalition allies. Le Pen, on the other hand, has very different concerns. Le Pen needs every dissatisfaction vote she can get as she gears up for a showdown with Macron.
“Giorgia… do you support von der Leyen’s second term or not?” Le Pen asked in a broadcast to ID representatives. “I believe so. And you will be contributing to the deterioration of the policies that the peoples of Europe are suffering so much from.” In her message, Ms. Le Pen told Italian voters against Mr. Meloni and against Salvini. He called on people to vote for his alliance. Andre Ventura, leader of Portugal’s new political party Chega, also supported Salvini in parliament. “We are not going to lie to ourselves. We are watching the ECR’s support for von der Leyen very closely, because it will be a very divisive element,” said Mathilde, president of the ID Foundation. Andrew concluded.
Mr. Meloni continued to evade the issue. “The problem is not the chairman. The problem is the majority that supports the president, because it is this majority that decides European policy,” she said. The important thing, Meloni argued, was to achieve a “centre-right majority” in the European Parliament, even at the expense of a possible compromise with the VDL.
Despite her best attempts to paint a rosy picture, the episode showed growing tensions within Meloni’s coalition government. Being a junior partner in an increasingly pro-establishment government has been a disaster for Salvini’s popularity, hence her recent efforts to raise her credentials as a populist. By distancing herself from Meloni over the EU, and by enlisting the support of populist heavyweights like Le Pen. But there is more to Le Pen-Melloni’s controversy than mere electoral calculations.
The VDL’s re-election issue exposes deep rifts not only between the EPP and right-wing populists, but also within the European right. Even within the ECR group, many of the largest political parties, including Poland’s Law and Justice Party, Spain’s Vox, and France’s Reconquet, strongly oppose making the VDL mandatory a second time. Even more alarmingly, the VDL faces opposition within its own group. The Republican Party, which represents France within the EPP, also strongly opposes VDL’s re-election, calling him “the candidate of Macron, not of the right.” It is thus easy to see why many of Meloni’s right-wing “allies” are concerned about his relationship with the VDL. The support of one of Europe’s largest and most powerful right-wing populist parties, along with Mr Macron and the Socialists, for a new Ursuline coalition is a major blow to the argument that right-wing populism is a viable alternative to mainstream European politics. It will be a symbolic blow.
Still, it would be a mistake to put all the blame on Meloni. In reality, the controversy surrounding the VDL’s re-election also reflects a fundamental problem. Itheological Differences of opinion between right-wing populist parties in Europe, especially on geopolitical issues. For example, the parties that make up the ECR generally have a strong transatlantic and pro-NATO orientation, and support military aid to Ukraine. The firm criticism of Russia by the entire ECR Group was recently demonstrated by the joint signing, together with the EPP, S&D, Renew and the Green Party, of a joint declaration on further military assistance to Ukraine in January 2024.
“It would be a mistake to put all the blame for this on Meloni.”
On the other hand, the ID group is deeply divided on this issue. The Salvini Alliance, which previously sought closer ties with Russia and Vladimir Putin, is now aligned with the political mainstream on Russia-Ukraine issues, while the Finnish Party last year He left ID for ECR due to differences of opinion. In contrast, both the National Rally and the AfD have taken more critical positions on EU and NATO aid to Ukraine, while many parties within the ID have abstained from or voted against any resolutions regarding NATO relations. ing. Similar fundamental differences exist between the two groups on other key strategic and socio-economic issues, such as EU membership, European enlargement, and China.
Ultimately, however, the biggest obstacle to the emergence of a unified European right-wing populist front has little to do with the ideological differences between the parties and more to do with the nature of the European Union itself. The degree of economic and financial control that Brussels exercises over its member states, especially some in the euro area, leaves even “populist” governments with little choice but to defer to EU decisions.
After all, the EU has done well in the past, including against non-eurozone countries, as it recently did with Hungary after Prime Minister Orbán threatened to veto the EU’s latest aid package for Ukraine. They have no hesitation in resorting to financial and financial blackmail. Brussels’ threats to sabotage Hungary’s economy spoke of the neo-colonial mentality that dominates the EU establishment and the lengths it will go to bring recalcitrant governments to their knees. As a result, populist parties, especially in the euro area, can afford to be radical while in opposition, but once in power they are forced to betray their campaign promises.
This goes a long way in explaining the difference between ECR groups and ID groups. Although the former includes several political parties that have been or are currently in power, ID-affiliated parties have primarily served as opposition parties in their respective countries. If they come to power, they will quickly shed their radicalism, as others have done before them. In fact, despite all the criticism against Meloni, the truth is that Le Pen herself is already experiencing difficulties in her bid to become France’s next president. The process of “melonization”– abandoned its anti-euro platform and softened its stance on Russia, Ukraine and NATO.
All this makes it hard to believe that a right-wing majority in the European Parliament would change this situation, given that the EU’s real powers are exercised elsewhere, such as in the European Commission, the Council and the European Commission. It means that you are ignorant of the world. At the European Central Bank. There is also no guarantee that electing more right-wing populist governments will create the conditions for “changing the EU from within”. Despite top-down efforts to “Europeanize” politics on the continent, European politics remains driven by national economic, geopolitical, and cultural dynamics, which are influenced by ideological affinities between governments. Regardless, they will continue to differ significantly between countries. By refusing to recognize the fundamental and irreconcilable incompatibility between the EU and democracy, right-wing populists across the continent are once again setting themselves up for defeat.
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