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The alarm calls come loud and fast. War may come to us. Military leaders across Europe are calling on their citizens to prepare for the outbreak. Political leaders from Britain to the Nordic countries to the Baltic states are increasingly stressing that Europeans need to prepare for a major war with Russia.
But Germany continues sleepily down the same path, as if nothing is wrong and nothing needs to change. Remarkably, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has not yet said that Ukraine should win the war. He knows the impact of Russia’s victory in Ukraine on Europe and speaks about it, but only says that Ukraine should not lose. This is a big difference, and it shows in German policy.
Instead of announcing bold new steps to prevent a Moscow victory from becoming a reality, Mr. Scholz complacently repeats and points out actions already taken by his government that fall far short of what is needed. ing. Instead of actively organizing a rapid expansion of European aid, he is shifting the responsibility to European countries. America.
German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius is trying to shake Germany’s elites from their slumber by arguing that society needs to: Kriegstich–War preparations complete. But instead of waking up to the danger and taking up the task, the Germans consider themselves complacent by blaming other Europeans.
Germans need to be honest with themselves and put national and European security above partisan politics. The country needs to pivot, but only by honestly assessing the vulnerabilities in Germany and Europe, properly linking them to the evolving situation in Ukraine and the United States, and in order to truly address the threat. This will only be possible by acting boldly, quickly and decisively. We all face it.
Warnings from across Europe are becoming louder and more frequent for four interrelated reasons. The Europeans’ acceptance of the unfolding war in Ukraine, the continent’s lack of significant military capabilities, uncertainty about the future of U.S. security, and, importantly, the Europeans’ determination to rather than showing our collective weakness.
Kiev has not yet lost the war, but it is no longer winning. Russia has long had the upper hand in ammunition warfare and currently outnumbers Ukraine in artillery firepower five to one, making an attack nearly impossible and making Kiev difficult to defend. Moreover, after a slow and unsuccessful start, Russia is now winning the “war of adaptation” and is beginning to turn the tide of the war in its favor.
Europe is still giving Kiev just enough to not lose (for now) instead of giving the Ukrainians what they need to win. This misguided approach has cost Ukraine dearly, but it will also cost European countries now that supply shortages and U.S. gridlock make defeat a real possibility. Defeating Russia in Ukraine would be the best way to thwart the threat posed by an aggressive and hostile Moscow—especially given the European powers’ weaknesses in both their capabilities and doctrine.
NATO’s use of precision strike weapons to defeat larger but less sophisticated adversaries allows them to attack multiple targets and attack territory to give them the time needed to neutralize the enemy’s war machine. depended on the possibility of making concessions. As Ukraine’s experience shows, what happens on the territory at that time is what matters. No free society can subject its people to Russia’s barbaric occupation.
NATO therefore switched to a plan to defend the entire alliance territory. But as Ukraine has once again shown, doing this in a conflict between states requires vast amounts of equipment, ammunition, and soldiers, as well as intelligence, communications, coordination, cutting-edge electronic warfare, extensive logistics, etc. key enablers are required. .
Most obviously, Europe’s capability gap could lead to localized competition in frontline states. Nevertheless, Germans should not feel a false sense of security from relative physical distance. Germany, Europe’s leading economic power, could be dragged into a conflict there by NATO’s mutual defense guarantees. expect to be tested By a Russian deep attack missile. Simply put, if the current alarm bells are not heeded, the Russian missiles that strike Kiev today could strike Munich tomorrow.
Although it is true that Germany, like several other allies, has increased its defense spending. Zuitenwende, epoch-making geopolitical changes have not come far enough or fast enough. The €100 billion ‘special fund’ will only address the most basic capacity gaps, not compensate for decades of mismanagement. Germany still needs a “leapfrog” in capabilities to defend itself and be ready to play an adequate role in NATO.
The fundamental problem is that Germany, like other European powers except Poland, has not rearmed in a way that would make it ready to defend itself. Former NATO Under-Secretary-General Antonio Missiroli is right when he says, “Progress has been made, but when you compare what has been done and what probably needs to be done, it’s still a long way off.”
The EU has broken its promise to provide Ukraine with “one million shells” by March 2024. They will only arrive by the end of this year, and in total, just over three shots will match Russia’s current rate of fire. A few months. As the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee said at the end of 2023, “we are seeing the bottom of the barrel” and European countries need to urgently ramp up production.
This is not just a German problem, but also a German problem. In 2022, the Bundeswehr had about two days’ worth of 155 mm artillery shells at Russia’s current rate of fire, or just 20,000 shells. The situation has not significantly improved by mid-2023, with Germany significantly underspending on its already low ammunition production plans last year. More is planned, but given current and medium-term threats, this is too slow and there is still no guarantee it will reach the levels needed to deter or defeat a resurgent Russia.
But isn’t there a contradiction here? In hindsight, European countries should have provided Ukraine with more and better weapons sooner, without worrying about escalation, as they have effective deterrents. Are we saying we should worry about the Russian threat because we have gaps in our own capabilities?
This is due to the changing situation in the United States. For now, European countries can rely on the Biden administration to fulfill their Article 5 responsibilities, but there are growing concerns that Donald Trump will be elected president, which could seriously undermine this guarantee. This would raise serious questions and have serious implications for Europe’s deterrence capabilities.
It will be difficult for Mr. Trump to formally withdraw from NATO, partly because Congress supports the alliance. But the battle is going through the White House, and there is a real risk that U.S. commitments will “relax or become more uncertain,” as Missiroli put it.
President Trump may sow doubts about Article 5 with his tweets. Furthermore, he made it clear that he could not only rely on mutual defense clauses, but could even encourage Russia to attack its European allies. Russian President Vladimir Putin is ruthless in exploiting uncertainty, especially when he perceives weakness, but Germany is reckless rather than preparing for potential worst-case scenarios. They are also pursuing a “wait-and-see” approach, satisfied with the status quo.
Germany, and therefore Europe, therefore potentially faces a perfect storm. Not only do European countries risk rewarding and emboldening Russia by failing to defeat it in Ukraine, they also lack key capabilities and are unable to respond at a time when their security future looks uncertain. has obvious vulnerabilities that have not been But it’s not too late yet. Here are five important things you can do to get back on track.
First, European countries need to collectively and immediately get what Ukraine needs to switch to “active defense.” This will allow Kiev to maintain the front in 2024 while building capacity and training sufficient troops to launch an offensive in 2025. European countries need to be proactive and not wait for the US to do so. All allies in Europe should find what they can send or buy from wherever they can to achieve this objective, rather than protesting that they have done enough. For Germany, this should include sending large numbers of Taurus cruise missiles as quickly as possible.
Germany and its European allies need to follow the example of Canada and assert the political will to find ways to legally seize Russian state assets frozen by European countries. Since the fight in Ukraine also concerns European security, it is right for Europeans to contribute. But European taxpayers should not foot the full bill, but rather make Russia pay for its defeat.
Ukraine needs to receive both a clear invitation to join NATO and a clear path to actual membership at the Washington summit. To achieve this, European countries need to show that they are serious about shifting the burden of European security onto ourselves. This is the best way to keep the United States involved in European security, but it is also the best way for Europeans to have insurance in case American commitments waver.
True burden shifting requires gradual changes in defense production and procurement. Europe needs to close capacity gaps, eliminate vulnerabilities and supply Ukraine. And if we can muster the will, we might. In exchange for large orders guaranteed for years to come, Europe’s defense industry will need to quickly expand and accelerate production. Government procurement systems must be delivered quickly or scrapped and replaced.
Germany, the EU country with the largest population and strongest economy, must take the lead in enabling better cooperation between EU member states in the production and procurement of weapons. Mr. Scholz, for example, could launch an incentive fund to finance rapid investments in European security.
This rearmament should focus on making Europe a formidable adversary capable of fighting a long, high-intensity conventional war, but European leaders also need to consider how to deal with the dangers facing their nations. We need to prepare society by being honest about what our plans are. that. European countries also need to reach a credible agreement on how to coordinate or create an extended nuclear deterrence among Europe’s NATO members to avoid exposure to nuclear threats.
The last step, the easiest to accomplish and the one with the greatest immediate impact, is that the German government finally, clearly and unequivocally state that Ukraine should win the war. is. The goal defines the means, and publicly acknowledging Ukraine’s victory will force the government to find ways to achieve it, including by taking the steps outlined above. It also provides the transparency the public needs, and the public will support.
Together, these measures will demonstrate the determination of Europeans to defend themselves, their interests and their values. It is not certain whether Russia will attack other European countries in the future, even if there are signs of it, but if it did, European countries would have to be prepared, and perhaps sooner rather than later. They will attack within two or three years.
If Europe is prepared, the risk of war will be greatly reduced. Deterrence works by significantly increasing the cost of invasion and reducing the likelihood that Moscow will defeat or conquer us.
There is also no tension between Europe arming itself and arming Ukraine. The logical sequence of this bold approach would be to buy Ukraine time to hold out and then launch an offensive, thereby buying the rest of Europe time to properly rearm. And if Ukraine is armed enough to achieve the common goal of victory, it will also eliminate the greatest threat that would otherwise face European countries in the near future. . But for that to happen, Germany’s leaders need to wake up.
Julian Stockl provided research assistance for this work.
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