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“People take Trump seriously, but not at his word,” was one of the wisest observations from the 2016 US presidential election. He shocked people by harshly criticizing and denying NATO as a useful alliance. In fact, during the Trump presidency, the Pentagon actually increased America’s military involvement in Europe.
Eight years later, we are revisiting these arguments. President Trump grabbed headlines well before the November election, suggesting at a recent political rally that the United States would not come to the aid of NATO allies who “don’t pay their bills” and, in fact, threatening to invade President Putin. He suggested that it might just encourage
It may have been a crude, thug threat, but it was so well received by the audience that it was such political dynamite that NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg was forced to comment. So should we take Trump’s words literally, seriously, or both?
There are several other factors to consider. A faction of Republicans is backing a bill in Congress that would allow for the next big round of funding to help Ukraine. Although he’s not yet an official presidential candidate, Trump’s position on defunding Ukraine is clearly the main motivator here. In other words, the official policies and promises of President Biden, the commander-in-chief of the United States, cannot be taken at face value. As a result, Ukraine is now languishing on the battlefield, forcing Stoltenberg once again to make an unusual intervention in US domestic politics.
But what we’re seeing here is an extreme version of a sentiment that has always existed in American politics. US foreign policy has long had a strong isolationist influence. And President Trump is an outlier in criticizing frugal NATO allies, both in the crude directness of his language and in his naked threats. All previous presidents have strongly argued, to put it tactfully, that wealthy European NATO countries should spend a far greater proportion of their GDP on their own defense. President Trump argues that brazen threats were necessary to force these reluctant allies to make recent funding commitments. Some analysts point out that the Russian invasion was the real irritant, but many in the United States will believe President Trump, and they may not be wrong.
President Biden accepts President Trump’s views on the rising threat of China. In fact, many believe that his actions, such as the Control of Inflation Act, CHIPS, and the Science Act, were actually more effective. And after the pandemic, NATO allies, including the UK, who preferred China’s economic opportunities over geostrategic threats, changed their positions. Indeed, now that we have calculated how dependent we are on Taiwan’s semiconductor manufacturing plants, Taiwan suddenly seems closer and more prominent.
The United States weathered the energy crisis better than Europe and remains a net exporter. Those who grinned as President Trump railed against Germany’s dependence on Russian energy will probably wince at that memory. You will remember that the Americans were right about this too.
European NATO therefore needs to resolve its current position. I don’t think it depends on whether Trump wins or not. The situation has revealed a picture that could have been ignored before Putin’s invasion. I can’t do that now.
The US pivot to Asia will continue, and it is in Europe’s interest to do so, as China is now seen as a threat to all. This will require Euro-NATO to take on more of the burden of defending Europe, as successive US presidents have called for. That would keep the United States involved and keep Russia out.
The lack of weapons to support NATO’s war plans was made clear by the demonstration of actual munitions usage rates in conflict and by the Ukraine war. And NATO cannot provide anywhere near the number of bullets Ukraine demands. As a senior NATO official, Admiral Bob Bauer, stated, NATO is currently staring at the bottom of the barrel.
The overly facile assumption that America’s “arsenal of freedom” would always be open to extremist NATO has been tested and failed. The US is also making cuts, and it used to be in no one’s interest to calculate the total amount. It is now inevitable that NATO will have to replenish its armaments throughout the country. It is necessary to build substantial military production capacity. No American president will foot the bill here, while European countries continue to enjoy welfare benefits that Americans can only dream of.
Current tensions in Congress and de facto conflicts in US policy toward funding Ukraine also make strategic analysts’ thinking very clear. Security policy across European capitals has not yet had time to catch up with commentators. But Europe will need to make adjustments to the need to hedge further against the chains of American isolationism that are proving to be teething in any case.
Meanwhile, U.S. policymakers will lament the loss of influence that a more independent Euro-NATO would bring. Many people would think that the United States spends a lot of money on defense, which would provide effective hegemonic leadership over a vast swath of developed countries, which would be of great benefit to the United States. U.S. weapons manufacturers are also likely to recommend caution regarding the U.S. withdrawal from NATO. If America’s allies are going to spend more on national defense, they will want to do so in their own national primes and increase resilient sovereign capabilities, rather than on American weapons that they were previously lining up to buy. .
Therefore, we should take Trump seriously, literally. But we shouldn’t panic, we can do what we have to do and reasonably hope that NATO will weather this mess. There is an opportunity here for major European powers to take leadership in NATO, but to do so they must put aside the parochialism that has plagued Europe’s defense sector and led to an inefficient production of a few things by all. You’ll need to put it there.
The obvious step for Britain is to expand the Joint Expeditionary Force, a framework nation of 10 northeastern European nations, from a nimble military group within NATO to one that shares the burden of overall military production. This also provides operational benefits of streamlining logistics through standardization across 10 countries. With NATO membership complete and on the horizon, Finland and Sweden each have excellent defense and “dual-use” companies, have built large stockpiles, and are implementing complete national defense programs. . The UK makes some excellent high-end equipment, but it is often not explicitly designed for export. If you get this right, it can be a real win-win.
Overall, assuming there are no major political failures, NATO will emerge from this mess more balanced, more resilient, and in better overall shape. If we can set aside the competition for parochial nationalism, we may also find efficiencies in force generation, and we may not need to increase the defense budget as much as feared.
But the wisest thing the West can do to realize that last wish is to ensure that Russia does not emerge from the invasion of Ukraine in a strong state that can credibly threaten NATO. Many politicians and military officials across NATO have recently envisioned this very scenario. It is in the long-term interest of everyone, including the Russians, that Putin’s gamble fails and the Russian military is defeated in Ukraine. The best investment we can make right now is sustainably arming Ukraine. In any case, the best time for Euro-NATO to do what it needed to do would have been immediately after the Russian invasion. The next best time is now.
Air Force Commander Edward Stringer is a senior fellow at Policy Exchange and former executive director of the National Defense University.
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