Germany prepares for decades of conflict with Russia

Defense Minister Boris Pistorius told Germans to prepare for decades of conflict with Russia and quickly rebuild the military in case President Vladimir V. Putin has no intention of stopping at Ukraine’s borders. I started warning them that I had to.

In a series of recent interviews with German news outlets, he said that Russian forces were fully occupied in Ukraine. But if a ceasefire is reached and Russian President Vladimir Putin is given a few years to reset, he believes Russian leaders will consider testing NATO’s cohesion.

“No one knows how or if this will continue,” Pistorius said of the current war, insisting that the German army needs to rapidly increase its size and replenish its weapons.

Pistorius’ public warning reflects a major shift at the top level of the country’s leadership, which has shunned a powerful military since the end of the Cold War. Despite the growing alarm, the German people remain unconvinced that the security of Germany and Europe is fundamentally threatened by a newly aggressive Russia.

The post of defense minister in Germany is often politically gridlocked. But Mr. Pistorius’s status as one of the country’s most popular politicians gives him freedom of speech not enjoyed by others, including his boss, Prime Minister Olaf Scholz.

As Scholz prepares to meet with President Biden at the White House on Friday, many in the German government believe that relations with Putin’s Russia will not allow a return to business as usual, and that the situation in Ukraine is likely to be worse this year. says it expects little progress. Putin fears the consequences if he wins there.

Those concerns are now intermingled with debate about what would happen to NATO if former President Donald J. Trump were elected and had a second chance to act on his instincts to pull the United States out of the alliance.

The prospect of Trump’s re-election has prompted German officials and many NATO members to privately question whether the nearly 75-year-old alliance structure, which they plan to celebrate in Washington this year, can survive without the United States at its center. We are discussing. . Many German officials say Putin’s biggest strategic hope is to break up NATO.

This is a surprising reversal of thinking, especially for Germans. Just a year ago, NATO was celebrating a new sense of purpose and renewed unity, and many were confidently predicting that Mr. Putin was on the run.

But now, against the backdrop of an unreliable America, an aggressive Russia, a struggling China, a seemingly stalemate war in Ukraine and an unpopular conflict in Gaza, German officials are thinking about the emergence of a new, complex and alarming world. is starting to speak. , with serious implications for European and transatlantic security.

Their immediate concern is that the United States will continue to fund Ukraine’s struggle, just as Germany, the second-largest donor, has agreed to double its contribution to about $8.5 billion this year. There is a growing pessimistic view that this may not be the case.

Some of Pistorius’ colleagues are now warning that if U.S. funding dries up and Russia gains the upper hand, the next target will be closer to Berlin.

Bruno Kahl, head of the German intelligence service, said last week that “Russia’s thirst for power will not be satisfied even if Ukraine is forced to surrender.” “If the West does not demonstrate clear defensive readiness, President Putin will no longer have any reason not to attack NATO.”

But when pressed about the possibility of conflict with Russia and the future of NATO, German politicians are cautious.

In the decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, most Germans believed that their country’s security would be guaranteed if they cooperated with Russia rather than against it, and that China was an important market for German cars and equipment. I’ve gotten used to the idea of ​​being a necessary partner. .

Scholz, a Social Democrat who has traditionally sought decent relations with Russia, remains wary of the far more confrontational future with Russia and China that Germany’s defense and intelligence chiefs have vividly described. They seem reluctant to discuss it.

Few politicians have raised the issue publicly, apart from Pistorius, who was little known until he was elected defense ministry chief a year ago. Mr. Scholz is particularly cautious, mindful of relations between Germany and the United States, and wary of pushing Russia and an unpredictable president too far.

Two years ago, he proclaimed a new era for Germany, a “Zeitenwende” or historic turning point in German security policy, marked by major changes in spending and strategic thinking. He said it would be. He made good on his promise to allocate an additional 100 billion euros to military spending over four years.

This year, Germany will spend 2% of its gross domestic product on military spending for the first time, achieving a goal agreed to by all NATO members in 2014 after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, but most experts say it is currently too low. I’m warning you. . And Germany has committed to permanently stationing a brigade in Lithuania by 2027, working to strengthen NATO’s eastern flank against Russia.

But in other respects, Mr. Scholz is acting with great care. He, along with Biden, has opposed setting a timeline for Ukraine’s eventual entry into the alliance.

The most vivid example of his wariness is his continued refusal to provide Ukraine with Taurus long-range air-launched cruise missiles.

Last year, Britain and France provided Ukraine with its closest equivalent, the Storm Shadow/Scalp, which was used to destroy Russian ships in Crimean ports and force Russia to withdraw its fleet. Biden reluctantly agreed to provide Ukraine with ATACMS, a similar missile but with a limited range of about 100 miles, in the fall.

The Taurus has a range of more than 300 miles, which could allow Ukraine to strike deep into Russia. And Mr. Scholz is not taking any chances, nor is the country’s parliament, which voted against the resolution calling for the transfer. The decision appears to be in line with German opinion, but Scholz wants to avoid the topic.

But if he is reluctant to push Putin too hard, it is a wariness shared by Germans.

Opinion polls show that Germans want a more capable German military. However, only 38% of those surveyed said they wanted their country to be more involved in international crises, the lowest number since the question began being asked in 2017, according to the Kerber Foundation, which conducted the survey. Ta. Of this group, 76% said engagement should be primarily diplomatic, and 71% opposed Germany’s military leadership role in Europe.

German military officials recently suggested that the country must be “Kriegstüchtig” (loosely translated as the ability to fight and win wars), sparking a small outcry.

Opposition lawmaker and Christian Democratic Party foreign policy expert Norbert Roetgen said the term was seen as “rhetorical overreach” and was quickly withdrawn.

“Mr. Scholz always said, ‘Ukraine must not lose, but Russia must not win,’ which shows that he was always thinking about the impasse that could lead to a diplomatic process,” Roettgen said. Ta. “He considers Russia more important than any other country between us and them, and he lacks a sense of Europe and his role as Europe’s leader.”

Roettgen and other critics of Scholz believe he is missing a historic opportunity to lead the way in building a European defense force that is far less dependent on U.S. military power and nuclear deterrence. .

But it is clear that Mr. Scholz feels most comfortable relying heavily on the US government, with senior German officials saying that Mr. Scholz is particularly concerned with French President Emmanuel Macron’s insistence on “strategic autonomy” for Europe. He states that he has a sense of distrust. Macron has few supporters on the continent.

Even Mr. Scholz’s main European defense concept, coordinated ground air defense against ballistic missiles known as Skyshield, relies on a combination of American, American-Israeli, and German missile systems. In response, the non-participating French, Italians, Spaniards, and Poles were furious, arguing that the Italian-French system should have been adopted.

Scholz’s ambitions are also hampered by an increasingly weak economy. It shrank by 0.3% last year and is expected to remain at about the same level in 2024. The cost of the war in Ukraine and China’s economic problems (with the auto industry and manufacturing being the hardest hit) are exacerbating the problem.

German analyst Ulrich Speck said Scholz acknowledged that the world had changed, but “didn’t say we had to change with the world.”

“He’s saying the world has changed and we’re going to protect you,” Speck said.

But doing so would likely require even more military spending, exceeding 3% of Germany’s gross domestic product. So far, few in Scholz’s party dare to suggest going that far.

Charles A. Kapchan, a European expert at Georgetown University, said Germans, and even the Social Democrats, “have come to the realization that Germany lives in a real world and that hard power is important.”

“At the same time, there is still hope that this is all just a bad dream and that the Germans will wake up and return to their normal world,” he said.