Division: European quail – CEPA

Without U.S. involvement, Europe’s underlying divisions will dangerously come to the fore.

European attitudes to risk vary. The “Life Free or Die” group believes that the risks of slavery under Russian rule are far worse than death. They will fight for freedom and sovereignty no matter what. The best of them are the Ukrainians, and they are doing just that right now. Close behind are the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as Finland and Poland. They believe there is a good chance that the war, especially if Ukraine loses. They are acting accordingly. Finland has always been well prepared, even during the paranoid decades after 1991, and has strengthened its military and civilian preparedness in 2022. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are building fortifications on their eastern borders. Poland is doubling the size of its army. All of these countries have increased their defense spending, well above the NATO standard of 2% of GDP. Sweden is close behind in terms of preparation and awareness, followed by Denmark and Norway.

At the other end of the spectrum are those who won’t fight no matter what. These include free riders (Ireland) and trough feeders (Austria), as well as those whose leaders have decided to befriend the Kremlin for opportunistic or selfish reasons. Hungary is a prime example. They collude with Russia and (in the case of Hungary) actively sabotage the cohesion of the alliance.

Most countries in Europe fall somewhere in between. They participate in NATO exercises such as the ongoing Steadfast Defender, the largest alliance training exercise since the end of the Cold War. They are slowly, albeit reluctantly, raising defense spending.

In a crisis, this sticky middle becomes unstable. Imagine, for example, Russia’s sharp provocations against the Baltic states and Poland. A small-scale land grab, possibly accompanied by cyber attacks, airspace violations, sabotage, and other serious threats, was carried out by the alleged volunteers.

Victims and their allies will rightly perceive this as an existential threat. This provocation must be met at all costs, decisively and (for Russia) in a painful manner. Failure to do so will seriously undermine deterrence and defense capabilities. The next attack and defeat are inevitable.

But other European countries will not see it that way, especially if they are stunned and bullied by Russian threats and stunts. They will urge vigilance, diplomacy and dialogue. Why should we risk nuclear destruction of European cities for some sectors of Eastern Europe? But it’s more than just words. These countries (such as Germany or Belgium) would be able to prevent reinforcements moving from the west to the east from using their rail networks, roads, and airspace. This is not a hypothesis. Germany did the same to Ukraine in 2021.

Not so long ago, such a scenario would have seemed so preposterous as to be unthinkable. NATO makes quick and unified decisions in crises. However, the driving force behind NATO is American willpower. And that switch is now only intermittently turned on, as Ukrainians are finding themselves making sacrifices. American pressure is essential to continental unity, just as the American nuclear umbrella is essential to European deterrence. America’s credibility in Europe has been seriously damaged by Congressional mischief over Ukraine policy. The results are already visible.

The UK has not been able to close the decision-making gap thanks to Brexit. France is not fully trusted in Eastern Europe, thanks to its political and presidential idiosyncrasies. In theory, Germany could play such a role, but not immediately or easily. This leaves European institutions, primarily the European Commission. Much ridiculed in the past, it now represents the best (albeit surprisingly slim) hope for coordinating the continent’s defenses. A new position for the European Defense Commissioner, equivalent to the High Representative for Foreign Policy, is being discussed but has not yet been agreed, much less filled. However, problems are already piling up and smoldering on the newcomer’s desk.

Edward Lucas is a non-resident senior fellow and senior advisor at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).

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