A decade of European failure in Ukraine

The leaders who oversaw the EU’s timid response to President Vladimir Putin’s seizure of territory in a neighboring country in 2014 have spoken out about why they backed down. This is a clear warning to EU capitals not to repeat the same mistake.

When Russia first invaded Ukraine in 2014, “Little Green Men,” unbadged Russian soldiers, entered eastern Ukraine and incited a fake organized uprising against the Kiev government. From February to March of the same year, Russia invaded and annexed the Crimean Peninsula.

By August, mothers of Russian soldiers were asking where their sons had disappeared amid reports that Russian soldiers were buried in unmarked graves to hide their role in the conflict.

In April, at a symposium hosted by the Center for Geopolitics at the University of Cambridge, Argita Dause, former ambassador to Ukraine and Latvia, said that the message from the European Union (EU) in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea was “no weapons.” he recalled. He said Ukraine was deterred from fully defending itself against an aggressive Russia in 2014.

Meanwhile, in the eyes of Ukrainians, the world’s response was woefully inadequate. “The international reaction was quite muted and Kiev felt alone,” said Catherine Ashton, the EU’s high diplomatic representative from 2009 to 2014.

One of the main problems with the EU’s response was the fact that it was not a military power. It has no military and relies on the protection of NATO and its member states’ nuclear capabilities.

After the first invasion, there were several adjustment factors that restrained the EU. Researcher Adelito Vicente says, “Due to the EU’s security specificities, nuclear policy choices, divergent political interests, energy dependence, and ineffective sanctions policy against Russia, Europe is reluctant to accept Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine.” I couldn’t stop it.”

However, an even more important factor that prevented Europe from taking a stronger stance was concerns about how it would be viewed during the Maidan revolution of February 2014.

“We knew that Moscow was looking at this, and that they were going to take a chance and say this was inspired by the EU, this was inspired by the CIA, this was inspired by the US, etc. I knew it,” Ashton recalled. “For me, it was very important that all they saw were people on the street, people in the square, and me talking to them, not showing any level of leadership.”

Maidan was a grassroots, community-led movement angry at the corruption of the Russia-aligned government of Viktor Yanukovych. At that time, European delegations visited Ukraine only to support Ukrainians who had clearly chosen to do so – they listened to them, but they did not exert any influence. Ta.

At the time, Europe was desperately trying to convince the West that Ukraine had strong ties with Moscow. “This doesn’t mean we couldn’t recognize it from a geography and geopolitical standpoint,” Ashton said. “Russia was an important country to Ukraine, and Ukraine was an important country to Russia. This was also about recognizing that.”

European attempts to keep Ukraine from luring in, showing too much deference to Russian feelings and not enough consideration for Ukrainian feelings, actually paved the way for a full-scale invasion in February 2022. I can now see that I smoothed it out. And, of course, the Kremlin could still find a way to blame the West.

Moreover, confronting Russia “would push the West too far from its comfort zone,” said the book’s author, Jakob Hauter. Russia’s overlooked invasion, Description of the 2014 Donbass war.

Hauter added that too many people support the idea that Ukraine’s problems are internal. This allowed Europe to ignore the possibility of a major war on the continent, making the situation even worse.

Another reason was Western selfishness. Germany, in particular, has important business ties with Russia and was reluctant to take a particularly strong response due to its own history.

At the time, sanctions were seen as having the potential to affect the economies of all member states and needed everyone to agree to be effective. “All 28 countries had to be prepared to be hit,” Ashton said.

Even with hindsight, Europe cannot be held responsible for Moscow’s aggression. Blame must continue to be placed in the right place: Russia.

Aggression born of revenge, sadism, and a quest for imperial domination on land and in the Black Sea, combined with a refusal to recognize Ukraine’s right to opt out of Russian-style “rule,” are the root causes of Ukraine’s ongoing conflict. One thing cannot be denied. ”

The consensus at the symposium was that the EU needs to realize its collective strength in the face of Russian aggression, and that it needs to take stronger practical steps to deal with the threat. The united response by Western countries to downing an Iranian drone aimed at Israel on April 13 deepened anger in Ukraine. Ukraine has repeatedly been left to deal with a constant barrage of Russian drones and missiles.

And Europe still lacks the necessary defense production capacity. After failing to meet previous ammunition shipment targets, the European Commission in March allocated around 500 million euros ($535 million) for production, with the continent set to deliver 2 million rounds of ammunition per year by the end of 2025. It is reportedly on track to reach production.

At the same time, however, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Germany still fall short of NATO’s goal of spending 2% of GDP on defense. There is also nearly $300 billion in frozen Russian assets that could be used to counterattack Ukraine.

We need stronger, more inventive collective strategies that are proactive rather than reactive.

As the widow of murdered Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny has said, “you have to become an innovator” to defeat President Vladimir Putin. . . He has to stop being bored. ” Europe should take note.

Aried Naylor is the author of “.Shadow of the East(Bloomsbury, 2020). She has lived in Russia for several years and currently reports from the Baltics and Ukraine.

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