Reinventing security and cooperation in Europe

After the Cold War, two European security institutions remained: the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Robust tankers in size and complexity, both organizations, despite differences in their roles and membership, shared the goal of enhancing the security of continental Europe and the transatlantic space as a whole. However, after 30 years, these organizations have taken different tack as they adapt to modern challenges. Of the two, NATO has proven more adept at reinventing itself. It may be a tanker, but it could be maneuvered like a yacht if necessary. The OSCE, which includes 57 countries including Russia, remains a tanker. Essential but cumbersome, in need of revision, and vulnerable to severe storms. If the OSCE is to thrive beyond next year, which marks the 50th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act that inspired the organization’s founding, it must take a page from NATO’s book of reinvention and embark on a new chapter.

Europe’s new security architecture after the Cold War

As the Cold War came to an end, Europe’s security architecture was at a crossroads. NATO has lost its clear purpose as an anti-Soviet defense umbrella. The Soviet-backed Warsaw Pact, which was intended to counter this, was rapidly collapsing. Many people questioned the need for NATO. The leaders met in July 1990 and issued the London Declaration. This was a key moment for the Alliance, redefining its operations for the coming years. NATO Secretary-General Manfred Werner says he will continue to clean up the legacy of the Cold War, help define a new European security architecture, ensure a reunited Germany joins the alliance and prevent war on the continent. It provided NATO with a new focus. The transformation of NATO was profound. Defense and force plans were revised, moving toward a smaller forward presence and less dependence on nuclear weapons. A new Strategic Concept (a document that defines the Alliance’s mission) was introduced at his 1990 summit and approved in 1991. It also led to the reorganization of the militaries of NATO member states. This guidance document lasts until the New Strategic Concept (introduced in 1999), which further refines NATO’s post-Cold War role and demonstrates the significant changes underway to ensure it remains fit for purpose. It turns out. The decision to invite Europe’s new democracies into NATO in 1999, starting with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, transformed the Alliance and Europe itself. Russia was considered a partner, as outlined in the NATO-Russia Establishment Act.

After 9/11, NATO’s critical agenda changed dramatically. It shifted the Alliance’s focus beyond its core mission of collective defense and emphasized its role in crisis management and cooperative security.

In the 1990s, the OSCE seemed an ideal venue to strengthen relations with Russia and integrate the Russian Federation into the Western world. The Helsinki Principles (agreed to by the former Soviet Union, after all) were the basis of this organization. The 1990 Paris Charter for a New Europe updated its mandate for the post-Soviet era, and the 1992 Helsinki Summit gave the organization a field mission and a human rights office. gave new abilities such as The principles have been implemented. The OSCE strengthened the transition from infrequent meetings to an organization with staff, offices, and engagement. This was the golden age of the OSCE. While NATO focused on macro-level security issues, the OSCE focused on human rights, democracy, press freedom, minority rights, and arms control. Unlike NATO, the OSCE considered Russia as one of its major members, on an equal footing with the United States and other participating states. The immediacy of the OSCE’s activities in Eastern Europe made this the pinnacle of the organization’s influence and effectiveness.

Reinvention shaped by war

In the 1990s, the breakup of Yugoslavia and the wars in the Balkans also tested NATO and the OSCE. For NATO, the debate was whether to conduct “out-of-area” operations, which was ultimately answered by actions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. The OSCE deployed its first monitoring mission to the former Yugoslavia in September 1992 (withdrew in July 1993), and with the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, it assumed the role of building post-war democracy in Bosnia. In Kosovo, the OSCE mission (established in 1999) has one of the largest field operations focused on human rights and governance.

After 9/11, NATO’s critical agenda changed dramatically. In response to terrorist attacks against the United States, NATO members for the first time invoked Article 5, which was shaped by years of coalition involvement in Afghanistan. NATO’s 2010 Strategic Vision emphasized the threat of terrorism and transnational threats. It shifted the Alliance’s focus beyond its core mission of collective defense, emphasized its role in crisis management and security cooperation, and provided the basis for NATO’s engagement in Libya in 2011. Despite ongoing military operations, NATO continued to expand its membership (seven countries were added in 2004, two in 2009, and three more between 2017 and 2023).

What complicates the tenuous relationship between the OSCE and Russia is its breadth of issues, not just member states. He has expanded his responsibilities beyond his original three pillars.

As NATO adapts to new security challenges, the OSCE will continue to expand its commitments to countries such as Moldova, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia (until December 2008), and Ukraine (from 2014 to 2022). The OSCE’s Minsk Group, under the joint leadership of France, Russia, and the United States, has been negotiating with Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh for many years. However, as Russian opposition grew stronger, it became increasingly difficult to fund and renew these missions. The OSCE’s security role has also declined. With the termination of major arms control agreements, the emphasis on confidence-building measures that promote verification and transparency has receded. Russia suspended and ultimately withdrew from the Convention on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). The United States and Russia withdrew from the Open Skies Treaty. The precious safety rails that the OSCE worked so hard to install are being gradually dismantled, and no new measures have been introduced.

OSCE and NATO in the wake of new Russian aggression

Today, NATO remains a defense alliance and is more important than ever. Bolstered by two new applicants, Finland and Sweden, NATO also boasts a new strategic concept to be announced in 2022. This new military posture will improve the Alliance’s ability to respond to threats. With increased military spending announced across Europe to strengthen NATO’s capabilities, it is clear that NATO’s role will continue into 2030 and beyond. Although NATO’s reinvention and reinvigoration was externally motivated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Alliance seized the opportunity and pushed accordingly. Although an alliance is essentially a union of like-minded countries (although the OSCE is described as a federation of countries), NonDespite like-minded countries), seizing this opportunity still faced significant domestic and political hurdles.

NATO has strengthened to counter the strategic threat posed by Russia. It is also included in the 2022 Strategic Concept, and has become even clearer in the restructuring of operational objectives following Russia’s February 24, 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The OSCE, of which Russia is a member, finds its ability to act increasingly limited. Everything is culminating in the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which will probably be the most difficult chapter in the OSCE’s history. Due to the OSCE’s consensual nature, Russia has blocked the formal adoption of the budget, forcing the OSCE to pursue special funding from each member state. Prior to the 2023 Skopje Ministerial Conference, Russia assumed the OSCE presidency in 2024, making it extremely difficult to choose a new country to lead the work (Malta took up the challenge).

What complicates the tenuous relationship between the OSCE and Russia is its breadth of issues, not just member states. He has expanded his areas of responsibility beyond his original three pillars (political/military, economic/environmental, and human) and now covers at least 24 subthemes and areas of focus. This reflects the increasingly complex nature of today’s challenges under the security umbrella, but narrowing down and targeting your activities will only strengthen your organization.

Tomorrow’s OSCE

How can the OSCE reinvent itself and remain relevant in this increasingly complex geopolitical world? This tanker, which harkens back to the early days before the establishment of the system, Some are calling for a return to the original meeting format. But doing so would mean the loss of decades of expertise and capacity, such as the OSCE’s field missions to monitor unfrozen conflicts. As the 50th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act approaches, can OSCE tankers be retrofitted for the future? NATO has shown that given the right opportunity and political will, tankers can act like yachts. The OSCE has a continuing purpose, and with continued Russian aggression in Ukraine and resulting elections around the world, the need for the OSCE will be greater in 2024 than at any other point in the 21st century. There is no doubt that. But to survive effectively beyond 2025, we need to learn from NATO’s example.

Robin S. Quinville He is the director of the Wilson Center’s Global Europe Program. She has spent more than 30 years as a U.S. diplomat, serving primarily in Europe, including assignments to both NATO and her OSCE.

Ambassador Philip T. Rieker (retired) He is chair of the Wilson Center’s Global Europe Program and partner and leader of Albright Stonebridge Group’s European and Eurasia practice. Prior to joining the Wilson Center, Ambassador Rieker served as Chargé d’Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in the United Kingdom (2021-22) and Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs (2019-21).

Jason C. Moyer He is a program associate in the Wilson Center’s Global Europe Program. Previously, he worked at Johns Hopkins SAIS’s Foreign Policy Institute, the Dean’s Research Institute, and the Center for Transatlantic Relations, the university’s transatlantic think tank. He is also a Fellow of the Transatlantic Leadership Network. His current research focuses on the European Union, NATO, transatlantic security, the Arctic, the Nordic countries, and great power competition.

Cover photo: Overview of the NATO Vilnius Summit in Lithuania, July 11-12, 2023. Photo courtesy: NATO.