[ad_1]
If North Korean nuclear disarmament is not achieved in the near future, the United States and South Korea should explore new approaches to managing and mitigating nuclear risks through proactive, practical steps.
new approach
In their self-interest to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict and seek stability, allies should adopt a new approach to the North Korean challenge. The new approach must address the mistrust that exists between North Korea on the one hand and Washington and Seoul on the other. Further stabilization of the Korean peninsula should be pursued so that future crises are less likely to develop into large-scale conventional wars that could lead to intentional or unintentional nuclear escalation. At the same time, the new approach may be compatible with the status quo policy of maintaining strong deterrence and aiming for “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”
In fact, in the current geopolitical climate, North Korea may be unlikely to be interested in such a proposal. However, alongside cooperative measures to improve security on the Korean peninsula, the United States and South Korea may also seek to reduce the risk of unintended escalation, particularly through unilateral measures. Ultimately, the United States and South Korea should recognize that the prospect of a nuclear-armed North Korea is likely to remain in the Northeast Asian strategic environment for the long term.
Relaxing North Korea’s low nuclear standards through declarative assurances
North Korea’s strategic predicament has led to a significant privileging of the role of nuclear weapons in its national defense strategy. Facing a traditionally superior and territorially contiguous nuclear-armed U.S.-South Korea alliance, North Korea has the ability to deter conflict and, if deterrence fails, weaken a North Korean attack. In order to asymmetrically escalate the use of nuclear weapons, the United States is threatening to resort to early nuclear use. Alliance. For these reasons, it will be difficult to encourage North Korea to shift to an alternative nuclear posture. More tractable for the alliance, however, are measures that recognize alliance actions and capabilities that are most likely to encourage early nuclear use by North Korea.
One very manageable short-term intervention could be declaratory assurances by the United States regarding the possibility of an offensive cyber attack on North Korea’s nuclear command and control systems. Since the Trump administration, the United States has pursued a comprehensive anti-missile strategy and is explicitly considering the possibility of using offensive cyber weapons to wean Kim from his nuclear arsenal. Lacking effective strategic situational awareness, North Korea would not be able to observe the United States preparing for such an attack in a crisis, but its leadership is confident that it will be able to effectively deploy its nuclear forces. They may be concerned that their ability to control the situation may be compromised. degrade and create incentives for nuclear use. North Korea would also fear a kinetic attack that could reduce its command and control, but there would be visible signs of the alliance’s preparations for a large-scale kinetic attack. North Korea’s concerns about these issues were crystallized in its September 2022 amendment to the Nuclear Weapons Act, which announced that it would use nuclear weapons “automatically and immediately” if its command and control systems were compromised.
By abandoning deliberate non-kinetic attacks on North Korea’s nuclear command and control, the United States could provide North Korea with important reassurances and reduce Pyongyang’s incentive to resort to early nuclear use in a crisis. There is a possibility that it can be reduced. This does not in any case require the US government to strip North Korea of offensive cyber capabilities that it would not be able to verify. However, the current approach of explicitly authorizing non-kinetic attacks on North Korea’s nuclear command and control is destabilizing. Such measures could be packaged with a broader and more ambitious set of U.S. proposals that seek to limit North Korea’s nuclear capabilities through a risk reduction process, if not through a denuclearization process. There is sex.
Risk reduction between North and South
Today’s military postures in North and South Korea meet the classic definition of critical instability. In other words, both sides have demonstrated a determination to launch pre-emptive strikes during war, seeking to limit casualties and gain strategic and tactical advantage. For North Korea, this threat of first strike is backed up by nuclear weapons. For South Korea, the pre-emptive use of conventional ballistic and cruise missiles, supported by high-quality intelligence, is a central pillar of its “kill chain” strategy.
Agreements, institutions, and processes between the North and South that can move both countries away from such a pre-emptive strike posture will greatly contribute to improving the stability of the crisis. However, if this fails, both countries should look to the 2018 Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA) as a template for managing sources of instability. Tensions in the CMA have been rising since 2019, when North Korea resumed frequent missile tests, exercises, and other military activities, but there is a possibility of misunderstandings and a large-scale conventional military conflagration. The basic logic of the agreement remains sound in dealing with possible incidents. It could escalate to nuclear level.
Once the political situation between the two Koreas improves, North Korea and South Korea should seek to re-operate the CMA or a similar successor agreement, which generally provides a greater buffer between the Korean People’s Army and the South Korean military. Such an agreement would not have to be tied to concrete steps toward denuclearization by North Korea, but would have the practical effect of limiting the path to a conflict that could quickly escalate due to first-strike postures on both sides. will bring about.
Reducing risks by improving diplomatic relations
Although nuclear risk reduction on the Korean Peninsula has not traditionally been emphasized, improving diplomatic relations between the United States and North Korea could have some beneficial effects on stabilizing the crisis. For example, the prospect of establishing a U.S. liaison office in Pyongyang and staffing it with one or more U.S. Foreign Service officials is a prospect in negotiations dating back to the Agreed Framework.
Although the liaison office is primarily seen as having diplomatic importance, the presence of U.S. officials in Pyongyang could help the U.S. at least in the capital (Kim’s This may alleviate concerns that the United States may consider using nuclear weapons against other countries (where it is possible). Nare). Reducing concerns about such an attack would have the effect of reducing Mr. Kim’s motivation to resort to nuclear use himself.
The United States and North Korea have revisited the proposal in subsequent negotiations since it was included in the text of the framework agreed to in 1994. Although no U.S. liaison office has been established due to the lack of progress on denuclearization, greater flexibility in denuclearization goals will allow the U.S. to manage its relationship with North Korea while reducing nuclear risks. It may be possible to take this relatively low-cost measure of improvement.
conclusion
The above recommendations are not uniform in terms of their feasibility and the extent to which they rely on existing precedent in previous diplomatic relations with North Korea. However, all of these measures are premised on contributing to the short-term reduction of the risk of nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula. In parallel to thinking long-term about the possibility of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, policymakers and military planners in the United States and South Korea are realistically considering continued coexistence with a nuclear-armed North Korea for the foreseeable future. should be recognized. Given their shared interest with North Korea in reducing the risk of a nuclear conflict that neither side desires, the United States and South Korea should actively seek to promote measures that can limit the risk of nuclear escalation in future crises.
Ankit Panda is a Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
[ad_2]
Source link