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Former US President Donald Trump sounded the alarm in Europe, saying at a campaign rally that he would urge countries he deems to be failing in their defense obligations to “do whatever you want” to Russia. European countries were already concerned about the possibility of a second term for Mr. Trump, and his comments exacerbated those concerns. European Commission President Ursula van der Leyen said: financial times Days later, he said Europe faced an “even rougher” world and “we have to spend more, we have to spend better, and we have to spend in Europe.”
Former US President Donald Trump sounded the alarm in Europe, saying at a campaign rally that he would urge countries he deems to be failing in their defense obligations to “do whatever you want” to Russia. European countries were already concerned about the possibility of a second term for Mr. Trump, and his comments exacerbated those concerns. European Commission President Ursula van der Leyen said: financial times Days later, he said Europe faced an “even rougher” world and “we have to spend more, we have to spend better, and we have to spend in Europe.”
But the question remains: Will Europe do enough to protect itself? Complaints that European countries are overly dependent on U.S. protection and reluctant to maintain adequate defense capabilities have a long history, and the wake-up call brought by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine It has not yet resulted in a dramatic increase in Europe’s available military power. Yes, NATO member states are now spending more money, and the EU recently approved an additional 50 billion euros in financial aid to Ukraine. However, Europe’s ability to maintain significant military forces on the ground for more than a few weeks remains limited. Europe remains dependent on the United States for some critical capabilities, and some NATO members have reason to think their partners could do much to help if that happens to them. Even if the partner tried they were attacked.
To be sure, the rhetoric from European officials has gotten tougher. Denmark’s Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen recently warned that Russia could test NATO mutual defense provisions “within three to five years,” and another senior NATO diplomat said, I no longer have the luxury of thinking about quitting.” Another senior diplomat said there was currently “near consensus” within the alliance about “Russia’s intent and ability” to attack NATO members by 2030. Because it could take Europe a decade or more to develop sufficient capabilities of its own, hardcore Atlanticists insist that, despite all the competing demands on U.S. time, attention, and resources, Uncle We want to keep Sam firmly committed to Europe.
Can Europe get its act together? Two established bodies of theory are relevant here. The first theory, to which I am contributing, is balance of power (or balance of threat) theory. The report found that if there were serious external threats to European security, such as neighboring powers with powerful military forces and highly revisionist ambitions, most of these countries would be able to thwart (or If so, I predict that they will join forces to defeat the threat. That urge will become even stronger once these countries realize that they cannot rely elsewhere for protection. Recent increases in European defense spending and Sweden and Finland’s decision to join NATO demonstrate a tendency for threatened countries to strike a perfect balance, and this well-established trend has led to Europe’s ability to defend itself. It should make us more optimistic about our ability and willingness to take on greater responsibility.
Unfortunately, the second set of theories makes that bright outcome less certain. Because security is a “collective good,” allied countries “pass the buck” on the efforts of others in the hope that their allies will do enough to protect their security. You may be tempted to take a free ride. they don’t do much. This tendency helps explain why the strongest members of an alliance tend to contribute disproportionately to the collective effort. If the leading members of the alliance take sufficient action to deter or defeat the attack, the contribution of the smallest member may become unnecessary. After all, even if he doubled his efforts, the alliance would not be so strong. Therefore, there is a temptation to act less, confident that the larger actor will do enough to serve one’s self-interest. However, if a sufficient number of member states succumbs to the temptation to impose greater burdens on others, or if other selfish interests overcome the need to cooperate, then the alliance is safely necessary. may not be able to generate integrated capabilities and coordinated strategies.
Taken together, these two well-known theories highlight the dilemma facing NATO today. The good news is that NATO’s European members have far greater potential than Russia. The population is three to four times larger, and the combined size of the economy is ten times that of Russia. Several European countries still had advanced weapons industries capable of producing superior weapons, and some (such as Germany) had strong ground and air forces during the late Cold War. Even more astonishingly, NATO’s European members alone spend at least three times as much on defense as Russia. Every year. Even considering rising labor costs, duplication of effort, and other inefficiencies, Europe has sufficient potential to deter or defeat a Russian attack if that potential is properly mobilized and channeled. have power. And the Russian military is not a huge force. Although its military performance and defense production capabilities have improved significantly since the outbreak of the Ukraine war, it has struggled to overcome fewer and less well-armed Ukrainians. The forces that would take months to capture Bahmut or Avdiivka are not going to successfully wage a blitzkrieg against anyone else.
The bad news is that continued efforts to build up a capable European defense force face serious obstacles. First of all, NATO’s European members do not agree on the level of major security issues or even what they are. It is clear that Russia poses the greatest danger to the Baltic States and Poland. But for Spain and Italy, Russia is a distant problem at best, and illegal immigration is a bigger challenge. Unlike some analysts, I do not think this situation will prevent Europe from building an effective defense against Russia, but it certainly complicates the problem of burden sharing and military planning. be. It will take some persuasion to get Portugal to do much to help Estonia.
Second, those who want Europe to do more face a delicate dilemma. We have to convince people that there is a serious problem, but we also have to convince them that solving the problem is not that expensive or that difficult. The challenges Europe seems to face if it attempts to rally support for a major defense buildup by exaggerating Russia’s military might and portraying Vladimir Putin as a lunatic with limitless ambition. will seem insurmountable, and the temptation to rely on Uncle Sam will increase. But if Russia’s power and ambitions are believed to be more modest and therefore manageable, it will be harder to persuade Europeans to make big sacrifices now and continue serious efforts over the long term. It will be. For greater autonomy to work, Europeans must believe that Russia is dangerous, but they must also believe that they can deal with the problem, even if the U.S. response is far worse. It won’t happen. For this reason, claiming that it is simply impossible for Europe to defend itself in order to maintain full U.S. involvement means that if it precludes a serious European effort and the U.S. Reducing involvement may have the opposite effect.
The third obstacle is that the role of nuclear weapons is ambiguous. If you really believe that nuclear weapons deter large-scale aggression, then you would think that British and French nuclear forces and the American “nuclear umbrella” would protect NATO from Russian attack under almost any circumstances. Dew. (It is worth remembering that Ukraine is not a NATO member). If so, there would be less need to build large and expensive conventional forces. However, if you are less confident in the reliability of your extended nuclear deterrent, or if you do not want to threaten nuclear use in response to low-level challenges, you may need the flexibility that conventional forces provide. Sho. provide. This issue became a point of contention within NATO throughout the Cold War, as demonstrated by the intra-Alliance debate over “flexibility” in the 1960s and the “Euromissile” debate in the 1980s. This issue remains relevant today insofar as the continued presence of nuclear weapons may prompt some states to decline their conventional forces.
Fourth, European countries still prefer to invest in their own defense industries and militaries instead of cooperating on standardizing weapons and developing common strategies and defense plans. According to a 2023 report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, defense spending across Europe has increased sharply since Russia occupied Crimea in 2014, but the proportion devoted to joint procurement efforts is It declined steadily until 2021, never approaching the previous target of 35%. Set by the EU. EU countries reportedly field around 178 different weapons systems, 148 more than the US, despite spending less than the US. A stubborn tendency to go it alone is wasting the enormous potential resource advantage Europe enjoys over potential challengers, and may be a luxury it can no longer afford.
The final obstacle, at least for now, is America’s longstanding ambivalence about encouraging European independence.The US generally wanted its European partners to be militarily strong, but they were not too much strong and politically united, but not too much United. why? Because this arrangement maximized U.S. influence over a coalition of capable but subordinate partners. The US government wants the remaining countries in NATO to be not only useful but also strong enough to fully comply with US wishes, and it wants these countries to become stronger and speak with one voice. Once they start doing so, it will be difficult to maintain compliance. The desire to maintain European dependence and obedience led successive U.S. administrations to oppose any measures that could lead to true European strategic autonomy.
But those days may be coming to an end. You don’t have to be a Trumpist to realize that the United States “cannot have it all” and that the burden of collective self-defense needs to be further shifted to European partners. But if the past is any guide, Europe will not let up as long as its leaders remain convinced that Uncle Sam is “all in” under all circumstances. Europe’s initial push for economic integration in the early 1950s was driven in part by concerns that the United States was eventually withdrawing its military from the continent, which would strengthen America’s ability to counter the Warsaw Pact. It is worth remembering that it was driven by European concerns about whether the creation of a large, unified European economic order; Although the security impulse behind European integration receded once it became clear that Uncle Sam would remain, growing doubts about US involvement were driven by purely self-interest This would give Europeans sufficient incentive to mobilize their military forces more effectively.
U.S. officials should encourage this development regardless of who takes the White House next year. As I have argued before, the process of returning European security to Europeans should occur in stages as part of a new transatlantic division of labor. Reduced dependence on the United States will force Europe to balance itself more vigorously, and moving slowly but steadily in this direction will overcome the collective action dilemma that will inevitably arise. It would give allies time to do so. European countries have much more military potential than Russia, so they don’t need to do this perfectly to be fairly secure.
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